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ABS'ffiACI' . 
Looking at the economic fortunes of the English-speaking Caribbean over 
the last fifteen years, we find that countries with the greatest promise have 
had a record of chronic instability. 'Ihis paper tries to discriminate between 
the inpact of unsettled world economic conditions and of domestic economic 
policies on the outcome for individual countries. We measure the inpact of 
oil crises, world stagflation, interest rate variability and exchange rate 
uncertainty. We find that the performance of the world econ0Jl1Y curtailed 
growth prospects everywhere in the Caribbean and increased the difficulty of 
economic management for all countries. 'Ihough the inpact of world conditions 
varied greatly from country to country, that external influence does not 
account for the variety of performance. 'Ihe extent of economic deterioration 
seems more closely related to the policies governments undertook in reaction 
to the changed external circumstances. In general, less adventurous policies 
seemed to have been more helpful or less danaging. 
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Introduction 
Although the economic performance of all 
English-speaking Caribbean economiesl in the 1970s and 1980s was 
below expectations, the most striking feature of the period was 
the fact that countries which seemed to have the greatest promise 
in 1970 suffered the most serious relapses. The years after 1970 
did turn out to be much more troublesome than anyone had 
conceived, with bewildering exchange rate fluctuations, sudden 
oil price increases, stagflation in industrial countries and a 
deep recession in the 1980s. These developments destabilized all 
Caribbean economies, even that of Trinidad and Tobago, which 
Istood to gain from oil price increases. Terms of trade became 
highly variable, with losses for the post-1970 period as a whole 
in almost all cases: export markets weakened and all countries 
were subject to inflationary pressure through imports. The 
challenge of attaining growth with economic stability was more 
formidable than expected. 
However, it was the policies adopted in the light of 
these circumstances that distinguished countries remaining in 
tolerable shape from those that regressed economically. Those 
countries that adopted fairly conservative demand management 
policies seem to have fared rather better than the less cautious. 
In particular, careful fiscal policies were a feature of the more 
stable economies, while fiscal excesses were hardly ever 
corrected for, although some valiant efforts were made. Other 
demand management tools such as monetary variables and the 
exchange rate appear to have had less powerful effects, and their 
impact was never sufficient to compensate if the government 
budget deficit was too large. 
It is a disappointment that Caribbean economies cannot 
boast of much success in stimulating the supply of output, a 
stated goal of most adjustment programmes. Adjustment is less 
painful if the country increases the supply of goods and services 
at the same time that people are being called upon to spend 
relatively less on tradeables. Supply seems to respond very 
sluggishly to changes in relative prices, which are the principal 
lever available to government. Moreover, it can be difficult to 
achieve changes in relative .pr~ces in the open economy. In 
Jamaica, which went much further than any other Caribbean country 
in its attempt to alter relative prices, severe currency 
devaluation was necessary before results were noticeable. The 
argument about the nature of supply responses is not resolved. 
Everyone agrees that they take a long time to emerge, and those 
who pin their faith on supply responses to relative price changes 
maintain that sufficiently large movements are of recent vintage, 
and it is too early to enter a judgement. on the other hand, if 
the obstacles to increased supply are institutional, price 
changes will not suffice. 
Although the impact of developments in the industrial 
world varied from country to country, all experienced periods of 
economic adversity brought on by weakening export markets, 
worsening terms of trade, high interest rates on international 
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financial markets and variations in exchange rates among the 
currencies of industrial nations. The harsher circumstances of 
the 1970s and 1980s precluded gains in per capita income such as 
the Caribbean had witnessed in the 1960s and eliminated whatever 
chances there might have been of bettering troublesome levels of 
unemployment characteristic of the region. Jamaica suffered most 
severely from these outside forces: Guyana had one episode of 
good fortune, a second of very bad: Trinidad and Tobago's oil 
industry gave it an advantage from the price increase, but sowed 
the seeds of disequilibrium which emerged when the oil market 
softened. However, differences in the external impact are not 
sufficient to explain differences in performance, nor does the 
deterioration in major economic indicators date,from the time of 
the most severe external pressure. Economies which failed to 
restore external payments balance soon after the initial shock 
found themselves defenceless in the face of subsequent 
disturbances, which, in general, had greater potential to do 
damage, and were more prolonged. 
The present paper aims to amplify and demonstrate this 
interpretation of the recent experience of English speaking 
Caribbean countries. We begin with a view of the economies as 
they must have appeared around 1970, matching their subsequent 
performance against the prospects that might have been projected 
from that year. Because economic events in the world outside the 
Caribbean took such an unexpected course, our next section 
analyses the effects on the region of such factors as terms of 
trade movements, stagflation in industrial countries, floating 
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exchange rates and volatile interest rates. The economic 
policies used to cope with the unforeseen turn of events are 
reported in the next section, and this is followed by an 
assessment of their efficacy. We offer some concluding 
observations on the lessons to be drawn. 
The Contrast between Expectations and Performance 
Although they both had serious problems of unemployment 
and uneven distribution of resources, Jamaica and Guyana were the 
countries with greatest promise in 1970. Each country had a good 
record of recent growth, encouraging market prospects for its 
exports, unexploited natural resources, and some of the skills 
needed for the development process. These proved to be the 
countries turning in the worst performance, with real income per 
head in 1984 falling below that for 1970, by a considerable amount 
in Guyana's case. Trinidad and Tobago, which was not expected to 
do particularly well, enjoyed a period of immense prosperity 
following the first oil price rise, but output tailed off in the 
1980s. Barbados and the Bahamas did a little better than was 
expected~ the remaining countries offered no surprises, although 
some experienced occasional growth phases. No country could 
claim to have adjusted successfully. Unemployment remained high 
everywhere - higher than in 1970, for most countries - and there 
was little success in promoting a strong upward trend in exports. 
Judging from the rate of accumulation of bank deposits and other 
financial instruments, domestic savings potential was high, but 
investment remained sluggish. 
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In 1970, output in Jamaica was expanding, the rate of -
inflation was modest and external payments were in balance. The 
outlook was good for two of Jamaica's major foreign exchange 
earnings sectors: there was strong, growing demand for bauxite 
and alumina and for Jamaica's tourist services. However, in the 
sugar industry, third in importance as a source of foreign 
exchange, prices were unremunerative at current production costs, 
and output had begun to falter. The domestic savings rate was 
adequate and investment strong. However, economic growth had not 
been sufficiently buoyant to cut down on a high rate of 
unemployment, particularly in view of the low labour requirements 
of the fastest growing sectors. 
The economy continued to do reasonably well until 1973, 
but in 1974 a very large balance of payments deficit and a fall in 
real output marked the start of a period of continuing economic 
difficulty for the Jamaican economy. A series of economic 
programmes failed to restore external balance, output did not 
recover and investors began to lose confidence in the country's 
prospects. The 1980s recession in the industrial world found the 
Jamaican economy still in disequilibrium; with the additional 
loss in output the recession imposed, it proved impossible to 
correct the external position. Balance of payments losses were 
increasingly severe, output contracted year after year, prices 
rose more quickly and unemployment reached nearly one-third of 
the labour force by 1984. 
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Guyana's economic prospects in 1970 seemed just as 
promising as Jamaica's. The economy was growing, inflation was 
low and external payments were in balance. Guyana shared with 
Jamaica the problem of high unemployment. The country was well 
endowed with natural resources - agricultural land, minerals, 
timber and hydro-electric potential - although they were all 
expensive to exploit. Guyana produced bauxite, and in 1970 was 
the only exporter of calcined bauxite, a special product used in 
the making of steel. The Guyanese were more competitive than 
their Caribbean neighbours in the production of sugar, and were 
able to break even at 1970 prices. Output of rice was falling in 
1970, but there were a number of other activities - forestry, 
fi_shing, cattle, light manufacturing - which seemed to offer 
scope for expansion. The major question marks were social and 
political. There had been allegations of widespread irregularities 
in the elections which consolidated Mr. Forbes Burnham's majority 
in parliament, and politics and society were divided along racial 
lines, between Guyanese of African and Indian descent. 
The Guyanese economy did rather well up to 1976. Output 
contracted a little in 1972 and 1973, the rate of inflation moved 
upwards and a surge in imports caused the balance of payments to 
be in deficit. But the economy recovered strongly, thanks to the 
rise in export prices in 1974 and 1975. In 1976 sugar prices 
collapsed, curtailing the growth of national income and 
depressing tax revenues with government caught midway in a large 
expansion programme. The Bank of Guyana was required to provide 
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considerable financing ~or government, and the resulting 
expenditure on imports produced a large balance of payments 
deficit. At the same time, output began to fall, partly because 
of reorganisation following the nationalization of large segments 
of the economy. By means of tight expenditure policies, the 
government was able to secure a gradual improvement in the 
balance of payments between 1978 and 1980, though at the expense 
of a reduction in real income. However, the second oil shock 
caused the balance of payments to slide once more, and income 
continued to decline. 
In 1970 Trinidad and Tobago's oil industry was giving 
cause for concern. Crude oii production was on the decline ?nd 
new refineries were being located elsewhere in the Caribbean. 
There was no other export sector with the capacity to make up for 
lost oil revenue. However, for the moment the national income was 
still growing in real terms, price increases were not excessively 
rapid and the external position was not fundamentally out of 
balance. Unemployment was at 10%; although this was the lowest 
rate to be found in the English-speaking Caribbean, there 
remained a permanent segment of the labour force for whom no jobs 
could be provided. 
The increase in international oil prices in 1973 marked a 
turning point in the Trinidad-Tobago economy. It coincided with 
the opening of a new oil field, and an uptrend in crude oil 
production. The interval from 1973 to 1978 was one of 
prosperity, with rising real income, very large balance of 
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payments surpluses and falling unemployment. However, prices 
rose very quickly, pushing up domestic costs to such an extent 
that production of tradable goods, such as sugar, other 
agricultural exports and manufacturing, declined, since they 
could no longer be supplied at competitive prices. Between 1979 
and 1984 difficulties emerged as national expenditure gained 
increasing momentum and payments for imports overtook receipts of 
foreign exchange. The external disequilibrium was only 
temporarily alleviated by the second big oil price increase, in 
1979. World oil markets weakened immediately aferwards, while 
Trinidad's production of crude oil declined. Output growth 
slowed and balance of payments deficits sharply reduced the stock 
of foreign exchange reserves built up during the 1970s. I. 
The Barbados economy was growing in 1970, but more slowly 
than it had in the late 1960s. The prospects remained fair for 
tourism, which had grown to be the most important source of 
foreign exchange, and there was some development in the re-export 
o.f cut garments stitched in Barbados. However, sugar production 
had fallen and farmers were making losses at current export 
prices. Barbados had not set up a central bank in 1970r although 
private banks might have financed balance of payment deficits 
there seemed no tendency to do so, and the external accounts 
remained balanced. Price increases were moderate, but the 
country shared the general unemployment problem of the Caribbean. 
The economy was jolted in 1973 and 1974, when output fell, 
a large deficit emerged on the external payments accounts, jobs 
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were lost and the rate of inflation reached record levels. 
However, in the subsequent recovery, which lasted until 1980, 
these tendencies were all reversed. A new and much more severe 
recession struck in 1981: prices rose once more, though they soon 
abated as the US and UK brought their inflation under control. 
The balance of payments, with a record deficit in 1981, was 
brought into balance by tightening expenditure. The fall in 
output was arrested only in 1984, and unemployment at the end of 
the period was higher than in 1970. 
In 1970 the Bahamas seemed to have a promising economic 
future, based on continuing growth of tourism; the major problem 
was the economy's extreme dependence on the US business cycle. 
Belize had agricultu~~l, tourism and forestry potential, but 
very little of the infrastructure needed to exploit them. The 
country was also under threat from Guatemala, which claimed 
sovereignty over its entire territory. Agriculture in the 
islands of the East Caribbean was in decline, partly because of 
prices but largely because of neglected maintenance and low 
investment in technology and agronomy. The islands had some 
potential for tourism, but the required investment in transport 
systems, public utilities and communications was large in 
comparison with national financial resources. 
The Bahamas, Belize and the East Caribbean all suffered 
setbacks in the early 1970s, with the impact of rising prices for 
their imports, fluctuating prices for exports and a fall in North 
American tourist travel. Expenditures adjusted as incomes fell, 
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with little attempt to finance excess spending. (None of these 
countries had a central bank in 1970, and they were not·yet 
members of the World Bank or IMF: their only s·ources of 
short-term financing were through bilateral government agreements 
and the efforts of private banks.) It appears that those 
countries that produced sugar (Belize, St. Kitts) and those that 
had developed tourism (Bahamas, Antigua, Montserrat, St. Lucia) 
recovered some ground in the late 1970s. (Prior to the 
mid-1970s, macroeconomic data on most countries is limited to 
trade, output of one or two major commodities and some banking 
statistics.) The remaining countries, exporting bananas for the 
most part, did not do as well. The recession in the industrial 
world had serious effects on all these economi~s, beginning 
around 1980 with rapid inflation. Some balance of payments 
financing was now available, and several countries borrowed from 
the .IMF and World Bank. Except for Belize and the Bahamas, 
governments were strictly limited in their ability to borrow from 
the monetary authority, and runaway fiscal spending was not 
possible. The Bahamas government kept its deficit within 
tolerable bounds, but the deficit/GDP ratio in Belize rose 
sharply in the 1980s. Tourism once again helped some countries 
to a partial recovery, but in general output remained sluggish 
and incomes depressed in 1984. 
The Effects of Economic Conditions outside the Caribbean 
Conditions in the outside world provoked balance of 
payments disequilibria, generated inflation and retarded output 
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growth everywhere in the Caribbean._ Foreign exchange receipts 
were adversely affected by the downtrend in the demand for 
bauxite and alumina, while tourism was subject to cycles in 
demand which mirrored the ups and downs of real income in the. 
industrial world. (For other commodities demand was infinitely 
large in comparison with Caribbean output.) The terms of trade 
moved against the Caribbean2, with a succession of. high annual 
import price increases in the 1970s. The prices of Caribbean 
exports also rose, sometimes very quickly, but the increases were 
seldom sustained over many years. Only the prices of bauxite and 
oil kept up with increases in wholesale prices in the US and the 
UK, and with the prices of exports. (The wholesale and export 
prices are the best indicators we have of price trends at the 
main sources of Caribbean imports.) Among the main commodities 
exported from the Caribbean, bauxite prices held up in the 1970s, 
but fell in 1980; the price of sugar fell in real terms (i.e. 
deflated by an index of foreign prices, based on the US and UK), 
even for sales under the agreement with the EEC. The price of 
rice rose steadily up to 1975, but fell thereafter and was 
significantly down in real terms over the period as a whole. 
Banana prices improved on returns experienced in the 1960s, but 
their prices too were down in real terms. The volatility of 
export prices created special problems, with sudden windfalls 
alternating with longer periods of comparatively low returns. 
The price instability also affected the outcome of negotiations 
for the Lorne
✓ 
agreement (between the EEC and the African-Caribbean 
Pacific group of countries), in particular the size of sugar 
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, 
quotas; Lome was concluded at a time when the sugar market was 
very confused, and old-established marketing arrangements had 
been thrust aside. Since the agreement was based on the 
prevailing'distribution of sugar sales, countries which had 
attempted to sell to new markets were left with short quotas. 
In the 1970-84 period most Caribbean countries recorded 
smaller investment inflows than in the 1960s, which had 
witnessed investment for mining, hotels and manufacturing. The 
1970s saw commercial banks emerge as the main conduit for 
financial flows from industrial countries to LDCs. The 
commercial banks seldom made loans with maturities beyond the 
medium-term; when they replaced investors as the dominant source 
of. international flows, borrowe·rs were .faced w1 th shortening 
maturities and heavier immediate amortisation burdens. In 
addition, bank lending broke the link between debt service and 
economic performance; loans must be serviced whether the 
investment they finance is performing well or not, whereas 
returns to direct investment depend on the surpluses earned by 
the project financed. The investment slowdown curtailed the 
supply of foreign exchange, while the changes in lending 
instruments meant that borrowers enjoyed a smaller ofmeasure 
security from holding a given stock of foreign exchange reserves. 
Very high real interest rates in international financial 
markets in the 1980s imposed severe foreign exchange losses on 
countries which had borrowed heavily abroad in their efforts to 
balance external receipts -~-I"l_c1 _pa~ents during '!:he 1970s. 
Barbados, Guyana and many of the island states of the East Caribbean 
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were affected, but it was in Jamaica tha~ the interest charges 
absorbed the most sizeable portion of the national savings. If 
the average payments on the external debt had been no higher than 
the rate of increase in the index of foreign prices, Jamaica 
might have saved substantial foreign exchange between 1981 and 
19843 • Because of high interest rates, a level of external 
borrowing which seemed prudent in the 1970s became insupportable 
in the 1980s. 
Sustained increases in foreign prices boosted inflation 
rates in the Caribbean during the 1970s, with relief coming only 
in the 1980s. The pressure from abroad was particularly fierce 
between 1973 and 1975 and in 1979, but throughout the decade 
foreign prices were increasing at more than five percent a year, 
much faster than for the 1950s and 1960s. They drove up the 
prices of final consumer goods imported, the costs of imported 
raw materials and capital goods and, eventually, wage costs as 
well. Once workers began to expect high rates of price increase 
from year to year they adjusted wage demands to defend incomes 
against erosion in their real value. 
The potential for growth in national income was much lower 
than for the 1960s, in all cases except for Trinidad and Tobago. 
For the majority it would have been difficult to improve the 
observed output trends significantly, given the weaknesses of 
many export markets and export prices. The other disturbances 
from the outside - foreign price increases, high interest rates, 
variation in exchange rates - had little effect on output, though 
they were all uncomfortable in other ways. 
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The balance of payments diseguilibria, inflationary__ 
pressures and loss of growth potential created decision problems 
of two kinds. First, the already troublesome unemployment 
problem became more intractable: not only were there few jobs 
being created in the tradable sector, surpluses for transfer to 
the non-tradable sector (notably government) were low, denying 
the possibility of job creation in labour-intensive non-tradable 
activity. Second, more skillful and active policy making was 
needed to cope with the swiftly changing environment. All 
the policy making institutions in the Caribbean are quite 
young, in contrast to those in industrial countries, and 
their capabilities were put to an early, rigorous and 
unforgiving test. 
(a) Jamaica 
Jamaica's net foreign exchange earnings were 
curtailed by terms of trade losses, slack demand for bauxite 
and tourism, and the costs of debt servicing in later years. 
There were terms of trade losses continuously from 1971 to 
1977 and again in 1979. The world demand for bauxite 
slackened in the 1970s and fell sharply in the 1980s, 
following trends in world aluminium production. Production 
slowed and then declined in the largest exporting countries, 
Australia and Guinea, although Jamaica did worse than 
average because of domestic policies affecting the bauxite 
industry. (In particular, a levy on production introduced 
unilaterally in 1974 invited retaliation by producing 
-14-
companies.) The demand for Jamaica's tourist services 
followed the economic cycle in North America~ downturns in 
1974/75 and between 1979 and 1983 were reflected in fewer 
tourist arrivals and low levels of hotel occupancy. All Caribean 
destinations were affected, but once again events in Jamaica made 
for a worse slump than was to be found in other tourist 
destinations.4 
The decline in foreign investment in LDCs by industrial 
countries was only one of a number of factors which made for a 
major contraction in the volume of foreign investment in Jamaica. 
The bauxite-alumina industry was just past its growth phase, and 
the heavy foreign investment needed to bring production to the 
1970s level would not be repeated. The levy on bauxite 
production evidently caused companies to try to reduce their 
investment exposure in Jamaica, and in general the government was 
less sympathetic to foreign investors. In addition, social 
upheaval undermined the country's reputation for stability, a 
factor which plays a large role in the choice of plant location 
by multinational firms. There was some divestment by foreigners, 
and government bought a number of hotels form overseas firms 
which had decided to close operations in Jamaica. Even if 
Jamaica had retained its attraction to foreign investors the 
inflow of funds would have failed to match that for the 1960s, in 
real terms; however, most of the loss of foreign inflows was a 
result of Jamaica's own policies. 
The cost of debt servicing threatened to keep Jamaica in 
permanent balance of payments disequilibrium in the 1980s; a 
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considerable portion of declining real income was devoted to 
interest
-· 
payments. Even with heroic efforts to reduce national 
expenditure, the surpluses for saving were badly impaired. These 
circumstances were partly due to domestic policies; if the 
macroeconomic policies of the late 1970s had been more 
successful, Jamaica's external debt would not have been so large 
nor the interest payments so crippling. However, at the time it 
was contracted the debt was thought manageable, not only by the 
Jamaicans, but by lenders, including the IMF, under whose 
auspices most of the borrowing arrangements were contracted. 
In contrast to the implications for the balance of payments, 
which were severe from 1971 onwards, external forces depressed 
Jamaica's economic growth only in the 1980s. ' During most of the 
1970s the country would not have been able to improve 
significantly on observed economic performance (if policies had 
remained the same) had the terms of trade and the demand for 
bauxite and tourism followed the trends of the 1960s. However, 
in the 1960s the economy seems to have been driven well below 
that potential. 
There were two periods, 1973-76 and 1980-84, when external 
influences created balance of payments problems for Jamaica; the 
first was also characterized by strong inflationary pressure from 
abroad, while output was seriously depressed in the second 
instance. The earlier episode was precipitated by volatile terms 
of trade, slackening demand for some exports and a fall in 
foreign investment. The balance of payments crisis could only 
have been corrected by a sacrifice of real output, even with 
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appropriate adjustment policies. There was insufficient finance 
available with maturities long enough to allow for stabilisation 
with growth. In the 1980s the losses on export markets were much 
greater. In addition, external payments were already in 
disequilibrium because of failure of· adjustment policies in the 
1970s. Under the circumstances the available finance did not 
permit of any adjustment programme that did not involve a harsh 
reduction in real output, particularly in view of the high cost 
of finance.5 
(b) Guyana 
In Guyana, there is a contrast between 1972-77, when the 
impact of economic developments in the wider world boosted 
foreign exchange receipts and speeded up the growth of income, 
and the 1978-84 period, when both terms of trade and external 
demand worked against the economy's prospects for growth and 
balance of payments equilibrium. The favourable influences of 
the first period arose from the fact that Guyanese sugar 
production was relatively high at the time when sugar prices 
peaked, and Guyana made very large foreign exchange gains. 
Furthermore increases in the price of rice boosted earnings up to 
1975 and bauxite prices stayed firm during the 1970s. The 
turnaround in external influences was signalled by the fall in 
sugar prices in 1976, and by the stagnation of prices for rice at 
about the same time. Bauxite prices fell in the 19R0s, along 
with the demand for the product. 
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The full effect of import prices on inflation in the 
Guyanese economy does not show in the price index because of 
extensive controls on official_prices. Nevertheless, a 
significant impact appears on official prices. The controls 
probably exaggerated the inflationary effects of foreign prices 
beyond what they otherwise have been, by creating artificial 
shortages and hoarding and by diverting a large proportion of 
consumer demand to unofficial markets. 
Foreign exchange inflows during the first part of the 
1970s afforded Guyana the opportunity to increase savings and 
invest in ventures to exploit the nation's untapped resources. 
That opportunity was not taken, and spending on current items 
increased to absorb most of the additional income. Even if more 
had been saved, the economy would still have been in great 
difficulty in the late 1970s and in the 1980s, because of the 
magnitude of the external impact, and the fact that few 
investments would have borne fruit so soon. The country's 
potential output was reduced during this period and balance of 
payments disequilibria could have been avoided only by cutting 
back real income. 
(c) Barbados 
For Barbados there were two periods when events abroad went 
against the economy, interspersed with a few years when they were 
of benefit. In the years from 1973 to 1977 the demand for 
tourist services stagnated and then fell, while there was a very 
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-rapid increase in import prices. The price of sugar rose to very 
high levels, but soon fell. These developments helped to create 
a short-lived balance of payments deficit, and contributed to the 
contraction of output in 1q74 and 1975. The import price rise 
was the principal cause of the virulent inflation recorded in 
1973 and 1974. During the period 1978-80 import price increases 
abated, the demand for tourism picked up and national output 
grew, with considerable moderation of inflation. The eighties 
opened with another bout of import inflation, but that soon 
subsided. It was followed by a slump in tourism. Balance of 
payments deficits were recorded and output contracted, but 
inflation rates fell to the region of five percent. 
(d) Other Countries·· 
Output in other Caribbean countries is driven by one major 
export - bananas, sugar, tourism, and, for Trinidad and Tobago, 
petroleum products. The price of bananas increased throughout 
the period, with big jumps in 1975 and in the period 1978-80. 
The Windward islands reaped some benefit, but in Jamaica, the 
other English speaking Caribbean producer, output fell to very 
low levels. 
Sugar producing countries made gains and then suffered 
losses from the price fluctuations already discussed, while 
countries with an important tourism sector experienced two 
periods of slack demand. In rrost cases national expenditure fell 
as output ano foreign exchange contracted. By and large, 
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domestic inflation followed import price trends. These factors 
made for an erratic growth path, even for the few countries where 
real output seems to have been higher at the end of the period 
than it was for the earliest year when we can estimate it (this 
varies from country to country). 
In Trinidad and Tobago external influences in the form of 
oil price increases proved highly inflationary and domestic costs 
rose so quickly that many non-oil exportables were no longer 
competitive. Inflation was also stimulated also by an excess 
demand for non-tradeables, largely the result of financial 
inflows from oil. A further inflationary factor arising from the ,. 
same source was congestion at the seaport, which led to excess 
demand for imports .. _With the decline iri oil prices in the 1980s, 
the balance of payments went into substantial deficit. 
Economic Policies 
The economic policies of all the English Caribbean 
countries were quite similar from 1970 to about 1973. Their 
governments all faced comparable circumstances, with some 
continuing growth of output, but a need to reduce unemployment 
and to control newly emerging deficits on the balance of 
payments. In one or two cases the rate of inflation had begun to 
speed up. Most countries tried to dampen expenditure, by 
ensuring budget deficits of modest proportion and by placing 
restrictions on the availability of credit to the private sector, 
when there was the mechanism to do so. 
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The effect of stagflation in the industrial world and 
rising oil prices was to induce very high inflation and large 
balance of payments deficits, followed in almost all cases, by 
windfall gains from the short-lived rise in commodity prices. 
Reaction to these circumstances varied greatly from country to 
country. The Guyana and Jamaica governments utilized windfall 
gains to expand current national expenditure, while Barbados and 
Trinidad and Tobago attempted to sterilize some of the proceeds 
for later investment. Other countries were limited in their 
capacity for active fiscal policy because, except for the Bahamas 
and Belize, they had no monetary authority that could be used to 
accommodate government borrowing. None of them took active steps 
to neutralize foreign gains and their economies seem to have 
fluctuated in accordance with the variations in foreign exchange 
receipts. 
As the economic fortunes of Caribbean countries diverged 
from 1976 onwards, their economic policies grew apart as well. 
To some extent this was a result of the need to address different 
problems: Guyana and Jamaica needed policies to achieve foreign 
exchange balance, a problem which did not confront other 
countries at that time. However, differences in the philosophy 
of economic management began to emerge as well. Guyana adopted a 
strategy based on state control and central direction of major 
economic activity in all areas of production and distribution. 
The system featured a wide panoply of controls on consumption and 
the disposition of resources. Other countries continued to rely 
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on the adjustment of prices and the use of inducements and 
directives designed to influence the behaviour of agents in the 
private sector, although there was some state ownership of 
enterprise everywhere. 
The individual government's policy stance was often 
motivated by the country's economic circumstances. Trinidad and 
Tobago, with large foreign exchange surpluses, embarked on a 
programme which boosted national expenditure, reversing earlier 
policies which contributed to increased savings. The Barbados 
government's policy was mildly restrictive, with growing fiscal 
saving on the current account and some credit restrictions as the 
main levers. The Jamaican government made attempts to con~ain 
national expenditure and to divert it from foreign to domestic 
goods, using adjustments to the government budget, exchange rate 
changes, credit restrictions and directives on the disposition of 
foreign exchange. The mix of policies depended on the size of 
the balance of payments deficit that had to be reduced or 
eliminated and the underlying trend in output. Countries with 
most serious balance of payments tended to rely more heavily on 
exchange and import controls: where the economy was contracting 
year after year we are more likely to observe exchange rate 
adjustment. Fiscal policies featured prominently in every case, 
and there were a variety of measures designed to influence money 
and credit. Exchange controls played a central role in Guyana, 
Jamaica and (very recently) Trinidad and Tobago, but they were 
not applied very stringently in the other countries. Jamaica 
made active use of exchange rate adjustment, and Guyana also 
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devalued the currency on occasion, but other countries largely 
eschewed this instrument. Jamaica's policies, which owed 
something to IMF influence (adjustment was carried out under 
programmes agreed with the IMF between 1977 and 1979 and from 
1981 onwards), were a hybrid of fiscal changes, price adjustment 
and direct controls, with external financing. The Barbados 
programme tended to focus on fiscal adjustment, mild credit 
restriction and external financing. 
All countries shared in the economic difficulties of the 
1980s, and they were all obliged to take measures to reduce 
spending. The instruments preferred did not change much, though 
they had to be applied in different directions (in the case of 
I 
Trinidad and Tobago) and· with greater intensity. Guyana 
maintained the command economy, though government showed signs of 
willingness to relax its hold as all indicators of economic 
performance steadily worsened. In Jamaica a new administration, 
elected in 1980, dismantled some quantitive restrictions on 
imports but the content of the programme was little changed in 
other respects. However, fiscal contraction was far more severe 
than it had been under the previous regime. Both Barbados and 
Trinidad-Tobago sought to achieve adjustment largely by trimming 
government budgetsr the Trinidad-Tobago authorities also 
determined on highly restrictive import and exchange controls 
after local manufacturers had priced themselves out of domestic 
and regional markets. 
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(a) Jamaica 
The Jamaican economy expanded in the early 1970s, but there 
were repeated balance of payments deficits and prices tended to 
rise more quickly each year. The authorities introduced measures 
to contain expenditure between 1972 and the first half of 1974. 
They included import restrictions, increases in the reserves the 
Bank of Jamaica required commercial banks to hold, increases in 
some tax rates and a penal discount rate for Bank of Jamaica 
advances to commercial banks. In mid-1974 the Jamaica government 
replaced the system of taxing bauxite companies with a new levy 
on production which was so large as to increase fiscal revenues 
in that year by 50%. Commodity prices rose in 1974, and theI 
economic outlook seemed to have improved. Government determined 
on an expansionary programme, abruptly reversing the previous 
measures to hold down expenditure. A very considerable 
government expenditure programme was launched, involving large 
outlays to create new jobs to be paid out of the current account. 
The expansion absorbed the additional proceeds of the bauxite 
levy in the first year. 
Economic output turned downwards almost immediately, 
however. Production problems were experienced in the sugar 
industry, overseas travel by American tourists was down and 
foreign investment had begun to slow down. Eventually bauxite 
companies cut back production in Jamaica in favour of other 
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producers, though-there was little evidence of this in the first 
few years after the bauxite levy was introduced. National 
expenditure remained very high, fuelled in part by fiscal 
spending. National output fell, the external payments were in 
deficit and inflation quickened. Government responded with 
relatively mild policy: tighter import controls, tax incentives 
to producers and price controls. 
There was a little improvement in the indicators of 
economic performance and by 1977 it was clear that firmer 
measures would be necessary. Over the next three years the 
authorities devalued the currency, introduced multiple exchange 
rates and, a crawling peg for a short period, announced budgets 
for the use of foreign exchange (to be managed by the Bank of 
Jamaica), revised exchange controls, imposed additional 
quantitative restrictions on imports and promulgated price and 
wage guidelines. In most cases the measures were undertaken in 
association with an IMF loan agreement, and they were supported 
by large amounts of medium-term financing (3-5 years) from 
international institutions and commercial banks. Economic 
performance fell consistently below expectations. Each of three 
IMF programmes was suspended because agreed targets were not 
attained; output stagnated while repeated balance of payments 
deficits eliminated foreign exchange reserves and reduced the 
country's credit-worthiness. A new round of adverse 
-25-
shocks-from abroad, beginning in 1979, aggravated the crisis. 
After a period of inertia in the closing months of the Manley 
administration, the Seaga government introduced new packages, 
beginning in 1981. The instruments used were much the same, with 
greater emphasis on fiscal contraction, more frequent exchange 
rate changes, and a reduction in the number and scope of 
quantitative restrictions. A willingness to tolerate very high 
interest rates was the only major distinction between the 
policies of the late 1970s and those of the 1980s. · The programme 
was supported by additional borrowing. Whatever its merits, 
prospects for successful adjustment were diminished by a marked 
decline in the demand for bauxite and alumina and by the effects 
I 
of the U.S. recession on tourism. 
{b) Barbados 
In Barbados no central bank existed in 1970, and the country 
shared its currency with seven other islands in the East 
Caribbean. Government's ability to sustain deficits depended on 
its success in competing with private firms and individuals for 
bank credit and on its credit-worthiness abroad. There were no 
provisions for influencing credit, and exchange rate changes and 
exchange controls proved difficult to implement because of the 
need to secure agreement among the eight governments 
participating in the currency arrangements. 
_ The economic: displace:rr1.ent _which <?CC:u~r~d ~n Barbados in 
1973-74 was largely self-correcting, thanks to the increase in 
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sugar prices, the revival of tourism (in 1976) and an abatement 
in import price increases. Government arranged some foreign 
borrowing to finance the 1973 deficit on the balance of payments, 
and no further adjustment proved necessary. Very high sugar 
prices produced windfall increases in foreign exchange in 1974, 
part of which was taxed away for later investment. Controls on 
selected areas of credit were introduced in 1977, remaining in 
place for the rest of the period, but there were no other policy 
developments of significance in the 1970s. Fiscal policy was 
neither particularly restrictive or expansionary and adjustments 
to monetary instruments and the exchange rate were minor and 
infrequent. 
I 
The second disturbance to the Barbadian economy, in the 
1980s, was met with active policies for adjustment. Government 
tried briefly to expand expenditure, in 1981, but reversed the 
policy the next year, imposing spending limits for each of the 
next two years. The controls on the use of bank credit were 
revised, but their impact remained selective rather than general. 
Interest rates were raised and a penal rate was imposed for 
central bank discounts. The programme was supported by 
medium-term financ.ing, from commercial banks and the IMF. 
(c) Trinidad-Tobago 
In the years prior to the oil price increase, Trinidad and 
Tobago maintained some controls on consumer credit, but there was 
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not much else by way of efforts to influence economic 
fluctuations. With the advent of oil wealth, the government 
determined to set aside a fraction of additional revenues for 
investment in new industry. This strategy was adhered to for 
about two years, but thereafter very rapid increases in 
government spending eventually eliminated savings on current 
account, and aggravated inflationary pressures by adding to 
already booming private expenditure. With declines in oil price 
and output, disequilibrium between income and spending emerged in 
the 1980s, and foreign exchange reserves plunged. Government 
responded in the first instance with tighter exchange controls 
and more quantitative restrictions. Only in 1984, as the loss of 
reserves 1 continued without let, did government decide to trim the 
fiscal programme. 
(d) Guyana 
At the outset of the 1970s decade credit controls were the 
only economic policy measure taken by the Guyana government. At 
the first impact of external disturbances in 1973, there was a 
brief episode of fiscal expansion as government tried to sustain 
demand. However, this policy was reversed in the following year 
and controls were placed on foreign exchange transactions. 
Although it was inflationary, the first external shock provided 
Guyana with windfall foreign receipts, which were partly taxed 
away by government. Government then used the proceeds to 
purchase most of the major foreign-owned companies operation in 
Guyana, absorbing all the accumulated foreign exchange in the 
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process. Once the sugar windfall ended it became necessary to 
trim expenditure: the exchange controls were retained, price and 
wage controls were imposed and government spending was cut, first 
by abandoning government capital projects and then by freezing 
wages in the civil service. Some external financing was secured 
from the IMF and through government-to-government arrangements. 
The second external shock widened the balance of payments deficit 
and provoked even sterner fiscal retrenchment. Output faltered, 
partly because of scarcity of foreign exchange, and the state 
corporations made heavy losses which added to the fiscal deficit. 
The measures taken failed to avert defaults on the majority of 
Guyana's foreign obligations and a massive build-up of payments 
arrears. 
(e) Other Countries 
Of the remaining countries the Bahamas and Belize had the 
greatest freedom in choosing economic policies. They both had 
independent currencies and central banks were established during 
the period. The other countries shared a currency and a monetary 
institution whose statutes allowed only limited finance of 
official deficits. Monetary and exchange rate policies proved 
difficult to execute because of the need to secure unanimous 
decisions. In practice, none of these countries went much beyond 
the use of the government budget as a policy tool. Fiscal 
deficits were not allowed to persist for long: in the case of 
East Caribbean countries, the limit was set by the rules of the 
monetary authority and by financing available from abroad. Some 
-29-
countries_negotiated IMF programmes in the 1980s which allowed 
more time for expenditure to adjust to foreign exchange losses, 
but in the earlier period, rapid adjustment was forced upon them. 
The Bahamas and Belize, which might have tried to influence the 
adjustment path, did little towards this end; government 
expenditures seem to follow trends of revenue and overall 
economic performance, much as private expenditures did. 
An Assessment of Economic Policies 
The two periods which called for an active policy response 
to displacement from outside the Caribbean to output, foreign 
exchange receipts and inflation were roughly 1973-75 and 1979-83.I 
The responses and their outcomes suggest the potential and 
limitations of economic policy making in the Caribbean. In this 
section we combine inferences drawn from a comparison of policies 
and economic performance with the insights to be derived from an 
~conometric model which was tested for Barbados, Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago. The model indicates the probable effects of 
different policies; using its results one may form an opinion 
about the impact of various policy packages (Table 2). 
Before 1973 Caribbean economies were expanding and no 
sustained balance of payment deficits were recorded; although 
unemployment remained high and there were some early signs of 
inflation, authorities were under no pressure for active 
macroeconomic policies. That picture changed, for the worse in 
most cases, in 1973, when very large balance of payments 
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deficits emerged and butput leveled_off. If nothing were done a 
foreign exchange crunch threatened to produce economic reversals. 
Trinidad and Tobago had the problem of managing a sudden increase 
in wealth which was inflationary, boosting expenditures to exceed 
the country's capacity to produce and distribute the goods 
demanded. For some countries, terms of trade gains in 1974 and 
1975 rectified the balance of payments, with little policy 
intervention. These countries temporarily shared 
Trinidad-Tobago's problem of managing the windfall in a 
non~inflationary way. 
The second, more serious and prolonged bout of internationally­
induced problems began with the oil price increase in 1979. and 
I 
intensified with the North American recession of 1981-83. It 
caused a turnaround in economies which had begun to recover from 
the earlier event and it further destabilized those that had not 
found a way out of earlier difficulties. All were forced to 
apply defensive measures. 
Economies seem to have fared better where the authorities 
concentrated on moderating expenditure in line with the trend in 
output, which was governed largely by performance in the tradable 
goods sectors. Attempts to make up for the slowdown in the 
tradable sectors - usually via expansion of government spending 
- ran into difficulty because of the foreign exchange losses 
brought on by the additional non-tradable activity. Countries 
that were cautious about fiscal expansion include the Bahamas, 
Trinidad and Tobago in 1973 and 1974 and Barbados, from 1981 to 
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1983. Their economic performance compares favourably with three 
conspicuous examples of fiscal expansion: Jamaica (1974-76), 
Guyana in 1976 and Trinidad and Tobago from 1976 to 1981. 
Fiscal policy has been the cornerstone of programmes that 
maintained economic stability, and the downfall of those that 
aggravated disequilibria. Where a policy package restored 
balance of payments equilibrium (Barbados, 1981-83) or came close 
to doing so (Guyana, 1978-80), tight fiscal policy was the 
predominant feature. The fiscal programme has its most powerful 
effect via the direct injections into the spending stream that 
come from expanded government activity and the increase in 
disposable income achieved by lower tax rates. The effects. of 
government financing, operating through the financial system, are 
much less influential. Because of the large import content of 
expenditure, any injection into the income stream has an 
immediate effect on the balance of payments. That impact is 
aggravated when there is no corresponding increase in output in 
the short-run; the balance of payments deterioration is more 
severe for government expenditure on transfers and wage payments 
than it is for increases of the same magnitude in government 
services. The relative potency of fiscal policy, in contrast to 
monetary policy, is something theory would have led us to expect. 
The economies remain very open to trade and finance despite the 
widespread use of exchange controls. It is therefore difficult 
to isolate the local money and credit markets so that their 
behaviour can be dictated by the central bank. (Table 2 summarizes 
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some effects of official policies, for Barbados, Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago). 
Exchange rate policy seems to operate on the level of 
expenditure rather than on the composition of the expenditure 
basket. One reason many advocate exchange rate changes in 
preference to other policies is that exchange rate movements are 
expected to alter the relative prices of domestic and foreign 
goods, saving foreign exchange by switching some spending from 
foreign to home goods. The reduction in overall spending needed 
to secure balance in external payments then need not be so 
great. There was a general reluctance in the Caribbean to 
experiment with exchange rate policy, so we do not have a great 
deal of evidence on its effects. The experience in Jamaica was 
that little expenditure switching took place. It was difficult 
to achieve a noticable change in relative prices; domestic prices 
contain too large an import element and wages were highly 
sensitive to increases in import prices. Furthermore, empirical 
tests indicate very sluggish effects of changes in relative 
prices on the allocation of expenditure between imports and 
non-tradable goods. 6 Insofar as it had an impact the exchange 
rate seems to have reduced the level of expenditure by generating 
inflation and cutting real income. 
Monetary policy suffered from a scarcity of effective tools 
of implementation. Jamaica used a variety of monetary measures 
in the late 1970s and in the 1980s: elsewhere some credit 
restrictions were imposed at various times by everyone except the 
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East Caribbean countries that were members of the joint currency 
area (the ECCB). Barbados and Belize raised interest rates in 
the 1980s, and very occasional increases in reserve requirements 
were the only other monetary changes in these countries. The 
main elements of Jamaican monetary policy from 1977 onwards were 
changes in the reserve requirements, interest rate manipulation 
and global restrictions on bank credit for the private sector. 
The credit restrictions created fertile soil for the growth of 
near-banks in the 1970s as devices to evade controls. Apart from 
evasion, there may be argument about the effect of credit 
controls on spending. There is a statistically significant 
association between credit and expenditure in the three countries 
for which we performed tests (Barbados, Jamaica and 
Trinidad-Tobago), but we believe the correct interpretation is 
that this reflects the effect of expenditure on the demand for 
credit. Increases in reserve requirements were sufficiently 
large to mop up excess liquidity only on one occasion, for 
Jamaica. In that case, banks recorded surplus liquidity after a 
very short interval. The reserve requirement therefore never had 
an effect on the level of credit. Empirical tests for the three 
countries mentioned above indicate that changes in reserve 
requirements will have little effect on the cost of credit, even 
where there is no excess liquidity. Unless the cost of credit 
increases substantially, neither output nor expenditure is much 
affected. 7 
We do not yet have measures of the impact of interest rate 




available estimates are dominated by relationships in earlier 
years when interest rate changes were quite small, and 
consequently the coefficients measuring their influence on 
credit, output, and spending are negligible. However, in 
Barbados casual observation suggests some short-term speculation 
by firms and individuals holding deposits or making financing 
transactions in Barbados and abroad, depending on the 
differential between local and foreign rates. In Jamaica, 
interest rates also provided an incentive to repatriate funds 
from abroad, but the increased costs of finance appear to have 
made firms that depend on bank credit less competitive in the 
production of tradables and more expensive in the production of 
non-tradables. These observations are based only on the .claims 
• I . 
of the firms concerned, since we have not empirically separated 
these effects from the effects of exchange rate changes, wages 
and other factors currently affecting prices and output. The 
interest rate increases in Belize are of very recent vintage, and 
their impact is still to be clarified. 
The experiences highlight the shortcomings of monetary 
instruments. Reserve requirements bite only when they eliminate 
excess reserves. Their effect depends on the ability to predict 
commercial bank reactions in an oligopolistic system, something 
which economists in the Caribbean are still attempting to explain. 
The reserve requirements must be supported by controls on the 
banks' recourse to foreign borrowing and the central bank must be 
prepared to close the discount window, so as to deny access to 
alternative sources of funds. Furthermore, there is a tendency 
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for near-banks to expand their activities as credit becomes 
scarce, and they substitute for the credit which banks may no 
longer supply. The non-banks also tend to frustrate direct 
credit restriction. 
If credit restrictions do have an effect, they are more 
likely to cause cost inflation than to reduce expenditure because 
supply functions seem to be more sensitive to the resulting 
increase in finance costs than are spending functions. The 
increase in the costs of financing may force firms to cut back 
output, but it is less likely to deter consumers. Moreover, the 
production of tradables goods is more likely to be depressed than 
the output of non-tradables; the producers of non-tradables may 
raise their prices to compensate for the increased finance costs, 
but the producers of tradables face prices which are determined 
on world markets, and some of them may no longer be able to 
compete. 
Raising central bank discount rates, purchase and sale of 
government securities from the central bank's portfolio and 
directives about interest rate levels are other means by which 
the monetary authority may try to influence output and spending. 
If they have an impact, it is through induced changes in the cost 
of credit, and the results are subject to the qualifications 
mentioned above. An increase in discount rates is effective only 
if reserve requirements are raised to mop up all excess liquidity 
and banks' access to foreign funds is limited. Under these 
circumstances banks are forced to finance an excess of credit 
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demand ov~r new deposits by discounting at the higher ~ate, and 
they will pass on the increased cost to the borrower. If 
government wishes to sell securities from its portfolio to 
commercial banks it must raise their effective yield to compete 
credit away from the private sector, unless banks have excess 
liquidity. If there is excess liquidity the sale has no effect: 
otherwise it tends to drive up loan rates. These effects are not 
only uncertain. They depend heavily on the central banks' 
willingness to shut off discounts or to impose a penal discount 
rate in circumstances where the banks are deprived of sources of 
funding other than the central bank. This procedure carries a 
high risk of jeopardizing commercial bank solvency, and no 
monetary authority in the Caribbean was prepared to adopt such 
draconian measures. 
The central bank's ability to support an independent 
interest rate structure is circumscribed by the pattern of 
foreign interest rates. If domestic rates are allowed to diverge 
too far from comparable foreign rates, finance flows inward or 
outward, irrespective of exchange controls. If the discrepancies 
between local and foreign rates are not too large (we estimate 
about three points between comparable rates, for the countries we 
have tested) the flows will be confined to trade credits and the 
disposition of investment income, which allows legitimate 
discretion in the placement of funds at home or abroad. If the 
dicrepancies become very large, there will be increasing resort to 
illegal transactions. The scope for independent interest rate 
setting is limited to a corridor around the ruling rate on 
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international financial markets where the co~ts of transferring 
funds outweighs the potential interest gain, a margin we estimate 
at one or two points. 
The Caribbean countries all imposed some limits on foreign 
exchange transactions, but Guyana {from 1973 onwards}, Jamaica 
{from 1976} and Trinidad and Tobago {from 1982} were the only 
ones to rely on them to control spending. Foreign exchange 
allocation was seen as an alternative way of switching 
expenditure from foreign to locally produced goods and services, 
but it was not at all successful in this role. It became 
profitable to set up machinery to evade exchange controls, and a 
large proportion of foreign exchange business was transacted on 
unofficial markets, which were inefficient and inflationary. The 
controls served to reduce expenditure, rather than to divert 
demand to stimulate domestic output. The profits of illegal 
foreign exchange dealers absorbed some of the funds diverted from 
imports, and the inflation generated by the reduced efficiency of 
foreign exchange trading reduced real spending power somewhat. 
Furthermore, it proved impossible to expand the supply of 
home-produced goods, largely because of the impact of exchange 
controls on the supply of raw materials. In the three countries 
where controls were extensively used the central bank's budgeted 
foreign exchange allocations were exceeded on every occasion, 
except for one instance in Jamaica {in 1978}. Even then, an 
unexpected decline in real income appears to be the reason for 
the reduction, not the foreign exchange budget. 
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The governments of Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago 
all tried at some time to control the general price level. In 
other countries only a small selection of items was subject to 
price control. There is little evidence to suggest that general 
price controls were useful; officially recorded price increases 
were rather higher for countries with general controls than for 
those without, and increases were not noticeably smaller when 
controls were in effect, compared with periods when they were 
not. Furthermore, comprehensive controls always provided scope 
for the growth of unofficial markets, where prices were much 
higher than those recorded officially. 
There is no reason to expect price controls to be effective 
in the open economies of the Caribbean. The prices of imports 
place a lower bound on the rate of domestic price increase. 
Inflation beyond that derives from institutional arrangements 
(distribution systems, customary markups and the degree of 
monopoly) and from the level of intended spending by the 
population. Price controls may sometimes be used to reduce 
margins if the power of monopolistic firms can be overcome, but 
this will be a once for all shift which will not affect 
subsequent trends in inflation. It is futile to try to repress 
prices when intended expenditures exceed the supply of goods and 
services; business will be forced on to unofficial markets which 
feature higher prices, because consumers have the spending power 
to pay in excess of the official price. In these circumstances, 
policies for expenditure reduction must be introduced; once they 
take effect price controls become redundant. 
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The Guyana government's strategy_for stabilizing the 
economy and promoting growth was to replace private sector 
initiative in major areas by a state owned, centrally planned 
economic system. The performance of the Guyanese economy since 
the main elements of that system were introduced in 1976 suggests 
that it has been a failure. The Guyana government lacked 
sufficient experience and highly skilled personnel, did not have 
the required administrative arrangements and was inadequately 
provided with information systems needed for such a complex 
undertaking. By 1985 the Guyana government was once again 
seeking private sector participation in major economic 
enterprises. 
The most disappointing feature of adjustment policies in 
the Caribbean has been the poor response of the supply of output. 
Although real output was higher at the end of the period for a 
few countries, none showed a vigorous and sustained growth in new 
capacity. The composition of exports was little changed, with 
output subject to fluctuations as at the beginning of the period. 
The adjustment process did not achieve any changes in the 
composition of exports that migh help to cushion future shocks 
from abroad. Guyana tried to achieve some diversification by 
direct state investment, but none of government's new ventures in 
manufacturing and agriculture was a success. The Trinidad and 
Tobago government also invested in new industry, geared for 
export marketsr the new enterprises all had distinctly 
unpromising starts, but for the moment they may be given the 
benefit of doubts about their viability. Jamaica tried state 
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ownership in the mid-1970s, before retreating from government 
controlled investment as the driving force in new production at . 
the time of the first IMF programme in 1977. From that time on 
Jamaica used a variety of market-oriented policies - including 
exchange rate and interest rate adjustment and wage guidelines -
in attempts to stimulate output. Barbados placed emphasis on 
institutional support for exporters - as did Jamaica - with 
little by way of supply oriented macro-policies. All countries 
provided protection for domestic industry. The principal element 
was the Caricom (Caribbean Economic Community) external tariff, 
applied uniformly by Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago. It provided tariff protection at rates ranging from 
30-60% for manufacturing destined for the regional market. In 
addition, investors in all Caricom countries were offered a 
harmonized system of fiscal incentives. Above this, individual 
countries imposed quantitative restrictions which varied greatly 
between countries in content and use. 
The government investments must be judged on their 
individual merits, while the institutional supports will take 
effect only after a lapse of time: consequently, most attention 
focuses on the effects of macroeconomic policies such as exchange 
rates, interest rates and protection. 
Although Jamaica and Guyana were the only countries to 
undertake active exchange rate manipulation, the constantly 
changing relationship between the exchange rates of industrial 
countries means that a fixed peg in terms of any one implies 
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variation with respect to all others. In this sense there was 
exchange rate variation everywhere. Its probable effects may be 
inferred by the way supply responds to price changes, as 
measured by tests on an econometric model. The inferences may 
not be valid for exchange rates which are not thought credible, 
and the analysis does not take account of unofficial markets. 
Because of the pervasiveness of unofficial markets in Guyana we 
are hesitant to draw conclusions from that country's experience, 
but elsewhere unofficial markets accounted for a small portion of 
transactions. 
Exchange rate policy stimulates output if it increases the 
prices of tradables relative to those of non-tradahles, 
pr~suming that it increases their costs of production to much the 
same extent. Demand for tradables is infinitely elastic, so if 
it proves more profitab~e to produce, outpu~ can expand. 
Estimates for Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago indicate 
there should be increases of the order of 6%, 1% and 5%, 
respectively, in the prices of. non-tradables, for a 10% 
devaluation in the national currency. In practice, this gain was 
obscured in Jamaica, where there was very little change in 
relative prices over the 1977-83 period. (Evidence for the 
effects of the most recent round of exchange rate changes, 
beginning in 1983, is not yet available.) Even where a change of 
relative prices does appear, estimates from the model indicate 
that the supply of output sometimes responds very sluggishly. 
The elasticities for Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago indicate 
the output of tradables is not affected, while output of 
tradables in Jamaica appears to fall when their price rise. The 
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demand for non-tradables does not increase, although their prices 
tend to increase.a 
Of countries around the world with open electoral systems, 
only a handful are able to implement nationally agreed policies 
on wage increases. Even these tend to break down in times of 
adversity. It is not difficult to understand why this might be. 
While all reasonable citizens may be convinced about the 
magnitude of the general wage increase, not everyone will agree 
that their relative remuneration on the day of implementation 
should be immutable. The Jamaican government tried on two 
occasions to implement national wage guidelines. In both cases 
parallel targets for price increases were set at the same time ./ 
and workers regarded their
•
acquiescence to wage guidelines as 
conditional on the price targets. This prejudiced chances of 
success, since government has limited control of domestic prices, 
given the high import content of local production and final 
consumption. The first set of guidelines, introduced in 1978, 
was adhered to, with an increasing number of exceptions, for a 
little less than one year. It was then abandoned. No further 
attempt was made until 1984, when the guidelines came under 
pressure almost immediately. Guyana was able to come close to a 
national wage policy by virtue of the extent of state ownership. 
Wages for a majority of workers were frozen between 1978 and 
19A0, and they have risen much more slowly than the increase of 
prices during the 1980s. Guyana has gained in competitiveness 
because of the fall in real labour costs, though this is yet to 
have any effect on national output. 
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National wage guidelines are unlikely to hold up for long 
enough to secure m:>re than a temporary gain in competitiveness, 
at best. (The state controlled economy is an exception.) It 
seems more fruitful to explore the wage determination process, 
which describes how workers react to economic circumstances and 
how negotiations between themselves and employers result in 
observed wage levels. The authorities may then try to influence 
the factors that play an important role in wage determination. 
Several studies of the process are now underway (McClean and 
Downes ~1982], Boamah fl984J). One result that seems robust is 
the delayed effect of inflation on wages.9 The authorities may 
do most to contain wage increases by ensuring· ·that there are no 1 
domestic pressures to aggravate the impact of import price 
increases, which is the best they can expect to achieve by way of 
anti-inflationary policies. 
Interest rate policy is frustrated by the fact that 
commercial bank rates have no measurable effects on the amount of 
finance the public makes available to firms. In the three 
countries for which econometric tests have been performed there 
is no evidence to suggest that people switch from spending to 
financial accumulation as interest rates change.10 Neither the 
growth of financial liabilities nor national expenditure shows any 
sensitivity to interest rates. Interest rates may determine 
whether the public holds local deposits or financial instruments 
abroad, given foreign interest rates, but they do not affect the 
rate of financial accumulation. Furthermore, there is no 
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evidence to suggest that the rate of investment is affected by · 
interest rates. There is not much evidence of an effect on 
levels of output either, and for fairly small interest rate 
changes the effect may be"too small to matter. However, it is 
plausible to expect that large shifts in interest rate will have 
a noticeable effect on cost functions, influencing the output of 
tradables and the price and output of tradables. If this effect 
should prove significant - and it did not, up to the time of the 
very large increase in Jamaican interest rates in 1984 - there is 
a case for a policy maintaining the lowest interest rate levels 
that are feasible, given foreign interest rate levels. 
Measures for industrial protection were adopted during the 
period by Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, in some 
instances to conserve foreign exchange, and in others to shield 
domestic producers from regional competition. The two 
instruments which contributed almost all the industrial 
protection in the Caribbean were tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions. Fiscal incentives, interest rate concessions and 
subsidies added very little extra protection. Customs tariffs 
remained largely unchanged after countries implemented the 1973 
Caricorn agreement for a common external tariff. (It set up two 
tariff regimes, one for Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad 
and Tobago, and another for all other Caricom members.) It is 
the manipulation of quantitative restrictions which marks the 
divergence in protective policies. In Barbados quantitative 
restrictions were----few-,. imposed on a limited number of items and 
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sometimes only for limited periods. Guyana, on the other hand, 
imposed comprehensive quotas and proscriptions of imports in 
1974, and they remained in force for the remainder of the period. 
Jamaica introduced comprehensive quantitative restrictions in 
1976, and they remained in place for the remainder of the 
decade. The majority were removed in the 1980s. Until 1983 
Trinidad and Tobago had only selective quantitive controls on 
imports, but in that year the net was cast very widely. This was 
the only instance where the stated objective was to protect local 
manufacturing which could not compete with imports from the rest 
of the region. Jamaica and Guyana were primarily motivated by a 
desire to conserve foreign exchange. 
As a result of individualistic policies on quantitative 
restrictions, the degree of protection varied from country to 
country and among industries within particular countries. In 
general Guyana offered its producers the highest levels of 
protection, followed in the 1970s by Jamaica, and in the 1980s by 
Trinidad and Tobago. The common external tariff seems to have 
stimulated the production and trade of labour intensive light 
manufacturing such as clothing, processed foods and cosmetics. 
Trade within the region grew significantly in the second half of 
the 1970s, boosting manufacturing output in the larger countries 
of the region. However, these advances were lost with the 
imposition of quantitative restrictions and regional trade 
declined in the 1980s. The quantitative restrictions led to 
gross overprotection of some industry, and permitted some highly 
inefficient producers to remain in business. 
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On the whole, policies to increase output in the Caribbean 
have not served the purpose. Industrial protection made a 
contribution to the growth of manufacturing, but it was taken too 
far, ultimately supporting fragmentation and inefficiency. 
Provisions for new institutions to promote and support production 
and exports are thought to be in the right directions, but are 
yet to bear tangible fruit. Exchange rate changes have fuelled 
inflation, without doing much to stimulate output. Interest 
rates appear to have had little significant effect in the 197Os, 
though we suspect they may prove stagflationary in the 198Os, 
inhibiting the output of tradables and inflating the price of 
non-tradables. Wage guidelines have not been successfully 
implemented. Policy-makers were afforded a narrow scope for 
affecting the production of tradables, which are the engine that 
drives the economy. The output of bauxite, alumina and oil owes 
little to domestic cost variation, while sugar production was 
inhibited by a numher of factors apart from price. Government 
policies were left to operate on non-sugar agriculture, 
manufacturing and tourism. Moreover, though government policies 
may affect output, the degree of protection is the only factor 
which seems to influence investment decisions. 
Only two adjustment packages seem to have been helpful, in 
the limited sense that the country survived a period of 
externally-induced stress in no worse condition than before the 
shock (see the scorecard in exhibit 1). The two were the Bahamas 
and Barbados, for the period 1981-83. Trinidad and Tobago's 
1973-74 programme might qualify on grounds that it provided 
-47-
-surpluses for i.nvestment which came to fruition in the l 980s, 
while Guyana's 1978-80 adjustment policies came close to 
satisfying the criterion. In the cases of Guyana in 1966-67 and
Jamaica between 1974 and 1976 policies proved distinctly harmful,
creating a balance of payments crisis out of what might have been
temporary disequilibrium. In these two countries, subsequent
policies (Guyana, 1980-84 and Jamaica, lq77-84) appear to have
failed, but they seem to have been in the right direction, until
very recently. In a number of other cases disequilibria proved
self-correcting, while in others no verdict can be entered, 
either because adjustment was involuntary (there was no
instrument for discretionary policy) or because the policy
·regime is of very recent vintage. 
The characteristics of the most useful policy regimes
include a fiscal programme featuring modest increases in 
government spending, a small deficit in relation to GDP and a low
public sector borrowing requirement. Monetary measures included
manipulation of the discount rate, changes in the reserve
requirement and credit restrictions. Discounts remained freely
available and banks usually had some excess liquidity, so the
credit restrictions alone would have been effective. In these
programmes there was no active exchange rate change, and controls
on foreign trade and finance were liberally administered. 
Industrial protection was limited to the effect of tariffs, with
quantitative restrictions covering a negligible proportion of
inputs. Adjustment was achieved by restraining expenditure
during the downturn in the tradable sectors and waiting for 
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external forces to stimualte new growth. In the case of Trinidad 
and Tobago, expenditure was contained in the presence of a rapid 
expansion of income. 
The worst episodes were characterized by fiscal expansion, 
large deficts in relation to GDP and a high ratio of public 
sector borrowing to domestic credit. Monetary policies were not 
much different from those in force where adjustment was rrore 
helpful. Exchange rate adjustment was more active, with a 
variety of schemes for depreciating the rate. Tight, 
comprehensive controls were imposed on foreign transactions and 
sizeable unofficial currency markets developed. 
Lessons From The Experience 
The Caribbean experience suggests that fiscal policy is at 
once the most influential and the one with greatest potential to 
harm. The world being an uncertain place, conservative fiscal 
policies seem to be best, to temper spending when output slips 
and to increase government savings on current account if there is 
a windfall. If the downturn proves of shorter duration than 
anticipated or the upturn more robust, a government will have 
accumulated reserves which may be applied to investment~ if 
events turn out worse than expected, the reserves allow time to 
take properly thought out measures to avert a crisis. 
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Governments have not proven very adept at stimu~ating 
additional supplies of goods and services. However, they have 
the capacity to do great damage, should they fail to correct 
external payments disequilibria. Supply responds strongly to 
stimuli which government may not influence, such as export market 
possibilities, social conditions and technology, and only weakly 
to price-cost margins, which may be subject to official 
manipulation. Moreover, official control of price-cost margins 
has not followed predictable patterns. 
Government cannot transcend the limits set by external 
markets and by investors' autonomous decisions about the rate of. . 
creation of new capacity. Government's task is largely to -
• I 
maintain national expenditure within the limits set by capacity 
and output growth. In the 1970s and 1980s this meant accepting 
reduced economic prospects, compared with what seemed possible in 
1970, and postponing hopes of reducing the outstanding chronic 
unemployment. 
The list of effective macroeconomic policies available to 
managers in small open economies is not long. Fiscal policy is 
both powerful and reasonably certain as to the outcome. Exchange 
rate changes and limited restrictions on credit, imports and 
foreign exchange may be helpful, though their outcomes are not so 
predictable, and they are accompanied by undesirable side 
effects, particularly increased inflation. If restrictions are 
pressed too far they become ineffective and damaging as evasion 
becomes widespread and inefficient black markets develop. Interest 
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rate policies and changes in reserve requirements do not seem to 
help much. 
If they are to do well, policy makers must pay attention 
to institutional strengths and management capabilities in the 
public service. Before embarking on a new course of action they 
should provide themselves the means of judging whether there 
exists the ability to execute it. The unrelieved failures of 
Guyana's nationalised industries are the Caribbean's most 
emphatic demonstration of this point. Moreover, the effectiveness 
with which existing policies are being implemented is in need of 
frequent re-examination. 
Economists and policy makers alike need to accept the 
limits to policy making inherent in social and economic 
processes. The economy is no more than a summary way of 
representing what are thought to be central tendencies in the 
evolution of certain kinds of contracts and exchanges. These 
transactions are being undertaken continuously by thousands of 
actors, and it is impossible to direct their behaviour in any 
determinate sense. Successful policy depends on understanding 
the interactions and finding ways of influencing them, and is 
most effective when it convinces the agents to alter their course 
of action. Agents may be forced off-target to some degree, if 
the nuisance is not great and they are not fervently attached to 
their objectives. But attempts to push beyond the limits they 
will tolerate will be frustrated by one means to another. To 
identify the limits is the policy makers's essential challenge. 
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The English speaking Caribbean may have wished for a
better deal from the rest of the world during the 1970s and
1980s. These countries were asked to shoulder a large burden of
adjustment, with choices which stunted economic growth, whatever
the policy c~osen. The prospect of providing adequate standards
of living for the population as a whole receded during the last
fifteen years, and every country was forced, at one time or
another, to take actions or to endure circumstances which reduced
living standards and aggravated unemployment problems. 
Nevertheless, it remains true that the Caribbean as a whole
should have fared better than it did, given the circumstances to
whi<;h countries were exposed. Had polici1es been less
adventurous, the fall in living standards for the largest
proportion of the region's population would not have been so
drastic, nor the current economic prospects so bleak. 
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Footnotes 
1. The countries examined are Antigua, the Bahamas, Barbados,
Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Dominica, Jamaica, Monsterrat,
St. Kitts, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Trinidad-Tobago. 
2. See Table 1. 
3. In 1984, debt service payments (interest and amortisation)
absorbed 30% of Jamaica's gross foreign exchange earnings.
The comparison of interest rates and world price inflation in
the 1980s is as follows: 
1981 1982 1983 
Interest on public debt
(World Debt Tables 1985) 11.0 7.9 7.0
Price increase fur
Tradable goods 5.9 1.0 0.2 (est) 
4. The Jamaican capital, Kingston, was plagued by sporadic acts
of violence and political clashes in the late 1970s. The
lawlessness spread to the countryside and some visitors wer~
hurt. The country acquired an unfavourable image in the
travel industry, and matters were not improved by the
government's leftist policies, which were interpreted as
anti-western. 
5. For an analysis of the potential of Barbados, Jamaica and
Trinidad and Tobago under conditions similar to those
prevailing in the 1960s (with respect to exports and the terms
of trade), see appendix A. 
6. The coefficient of the relative price term is insignificant
in estimates of the import equation for Jamaica, as well in
the estimate for expenditure on non-tradable goods (Worrell &
Holder (1984], p. 249). Relative prices had negligible
effects in Trinidad-Tobago as well. In Barbados, imports are
sensitive to relative prices, but expenditure on
non-tradables is not. 
7. The cost of credit is included in equations for estimating
the output of tradables, the expenditure on non-tradables and
the supply of non-tradables; in no case did it have a
significant effect (Worrell & Holder, pp. 243-250). 
8. Worrell & Holder, pp. 243-250, equations (1) and (3) for each
country. 
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9. Worrell & Holder report a significant effect of prices,
lagged one period, on wages for Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago, 
but not for Barbados (equation (10} - Trinidad - or (11};
Boamah reports significant price effects for Barbados with a 
rather different specification (Boamah ~19841, p. 268}. 
10. We may infer this from earlier evidence of the insensitivity 
of expenditure to interest rate changes. For deposits we 
test for the effect of differentials between domestic rates 
and rates abroad, with an allowance for small discrepancies 
between them; they were significant for Trinidad and Tobago, 
but not for Barbados and Jamaica. 
-54-
References 
Boamah, Daniel, 'Wage Formation, Employment and Output inBarbados,' Central Bank of Barbados, 'Unpublished ResearchPapers 1984,' pp. 255-274. 
McClean, Wendell and Andrew Downes, 'Wage Formation in Barbados,'University of the West Indies, Department of Economics,Cave Hill, 1982. 
Worrell, DeLisle, 'Monetary Mechanisms in Open Economies: AModel for the Caribbean,' in M. Connolly and J. McDermott{eds.), The Economics of the Caribbean Basin, Praeger, 1985. 
Worrell, D. and c. Holder, 'A Model for Forecasting in theCaribbean,' Central Bank of Barbados, 'Unpublished ResearchPapers 1984,' pp. 215-254. 
-55-
Table 1
Hf1s:t1 gf ,ban11 in ~~t1tn1l fati1bl11 gn lalancc gf Iu1h
(Millions of dollar,, local currency) 
lubadga Guyana 
Import Export Terms of Demand Import Export Terms of DemandPrice, Prices* Trade Factors Prices Prices Trade Factors
(Tourism) (Bauxite,(1) (2) (2) -(1) Alumina) 
1967 -10.9 0.5 11.4 5.5 
1968 10.4 8.1 -2.3 9.2 
1969 15.0 J.l -11.9 8.7 14.4 
1970 8.3 -4.8 -13.1 9.3 4. 7 6.7 2.0 14. 7 
1971 14.5 2.9 -11.6 16.9 -0.1 7.1 7.2 -8.6 
1972 18. 1 5.3 -12 .8 11.5 4.4 31.0 26.6 -27 .3 
1973 56.9 -2.2 -59. 1 6.7 11.5 40.3 28.8 2.6 
1974 117.3 17.6 -99.7 
·/ 
5.3 26.6 90 .8 64.2 -6.4 
1975 57.0 144.4 87.4 -6.2 35.2 248.4 213.2 5. 1 
1976 60.9 -96. 9 -157.8 2.0 14.4 760.5 746.1 -98.0 
1977 55.7 -0 .8 -56.5 33.4 -13.8 -221.8 -235.6 184.9 
1978 32.5 1.2 -31.3 39 .4 -13.1 -36 .8 -49.9 22.1 
1979 55.1 29.6 -25.5 47.2 17.4 58. 7 41.3 -50.8 
1980 43.4 96.0 52.6 -1.1 34.0 213.3 179.3 48.4 
1981 6 2. 9 -16.8 - 79. 7 - 2 3. 9 38.6 7.6 -31.0 -72.4 
1982 15.1 -6. 8 -21.9 -73.1 n.a. n.a. -146.2 
*Excludes tourism 
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gffecti ot·chan,c in External Variable• op Jalapcc of Irrui~
(Killion, of dollar•, local currency) 
Jamaica Trinidad aud Tobago 
Import lzport Term• of Demand Import Export Term• of Demand
Price ■ Price ■ Trade Factor• Price,.,. Price•• Trade Factor•
(Bz,al, (Oil)
tour) 
1961 6.7 -1.3 -8.0 -21.8 
1962 13.6 3.0 -10.6 -28.5 
1963 10.6 10.6 -33.3 
1964 6.6 -4.0 -10.6 -3 .1 
1965 2.5 -7.4 -10.0 -4.8 
1966 8.1 3.4 -4.7 -18.5 
1967 4.4 -7.1 -35.7 
1968 14.7 26.1 11.5 -34.3 
1969 25.1 2.4 -22.6 -1.6 
1970 11.4 29.0 17 .5 23.3 14.7 5.6 -9.1 -43 .1 
1971 39.1 -2.1 -41.1 -18.5 41.l 48.9 7.9 -17.6 
1972 20.8 0.4 -20.4 -3.8 32.8 4.2 -28.6 -16.1 
1973 192.7 55.0 -137.6 -33.5 61.7 117 .1 55.3 216.4 
1974 294.8 183.2 -111.6 2.4 753.7 977 .9 224.2 1002.6 
1975 99.5 325.7 226.1 -242.9 218.1 230.5 12.3 968 .2 
1976 55.8 -50.4 -106.2 -356 .1 401.9 352.5 -49.3 321.4 
1977 120.7 29.9 -90.6 4.4 75.4 231.2 155.7 622.0 
1978 16.8 427.1 410.3 16.5 141.4 -6.7 -148.1 -112.7 
1979 205.7 351.8 146 .1 -106.6 397 .3 968. 7 571.4 1810.6 
1980 481.7 188.6 -293 .1 -48.0 2432 .6 2898.0 465.4 2210.8 
1981 123.6 -7.2 -130.8 -44.0 909.2 714.9 -194.3 -631.2 
1982 2 6 • 7 4 2 •6 15 • 9 - 3 5 8 • 0 61 7 . 8 - 4 5 0 • 9 -10 6 .8 • 7 -14 9 3 . 4
'lhfrExcluding imports of crude oil for refining
+Based on exports net of crude oil imports
Note: based on values in (t-1) times percentage changes in prices or output in (t).Sources: Central Bank of Barbados, Annual Statistical Digest and Balance ofPayments; International Financial Statistics; UN Yearbook of International TradeStatistics; IMF Balance of Payments Yearbook (Details available on request). 
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Table 2
Effects of Selected Policies 
(1) Approxiaate effects of fiscal pro1rU111e to increase GDP by 1, (direct
10Ternaent actiTity) 
Bdos 1a TT 
Chana• in total GDP c,) 1.99 1 1 
Chan1e in GDP deflator c,> 0.96 0:A/y 
Chan1e in iaporta (') 7.23 1.08 0.83 
(2) Approximate effects of an increase in 1ov't transfer payments which adds
the equivalent of 1, of GDP to the expenditure stream, evenly distriubtedbetween additional spending on imports and on non-tradables. 
Bdos Ja TT 
0.49 
Change in deflator 0.48 Qn./y 
Change in imports (") . 2.29 o.s o.s 
(3) Approximate effects of tax increases that reduce disposable income by 1, of
GDP 
Bdos Ja TT 
-0.99 
Change in GDP deflator (') 0.96 0:A/y 
Change in imports(') -7 .23 -1.08 -0.83 
(4) Approximate measures of the impact of changes in monetary instrll.lllents;
impact on cost of borrowing 
Bdos Ja TT 
arJaCrp (Credit limits) 0.004 
ar/aq (Reserve requirements) 0.004D 
ar/arb (Discount rate) 0.057 
ar/arg(Gov't note rate) 
D: bank deposits 
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Table 2 continued •••• 
(5). The effect, of chanaea in the coat of borrowina. 
Effect on (elasticity) Bdoa 1& TT 
Output of tradablea 0.87 
Output of non-tradables 
Price of non-tradablea 
(6) The effect, of a 1°'9 currency devaluation 
Bdos 1a TT 
On the prices of tradables (,) 0.61 1.00 3 .47 
On the demand for non-tradables(,) 
On the demand for imports(') 1.71 -1.33 
On national output (') 0.67 -1.23 
On the GDP deflatMe (')
09" 
6.84 5 .94' 4.19 




Outcome, of Adjustment Policie1 
Helpful Harmful No Ycnfic t Automatic 
Adjustment 
Bdoa, 81-83 Guy, 76 ,77 Guy, 79-84 TT, 82+ Bdos, 73-7S 
Bah, 81-83 Jca, 74-76 Jca, 77-84 Dom, 80+ Guy, 73-7S 
TT, 73-74 St K., 80+ St. L., 80+ 
Guy, 78-80? Ant., 80+ Mont, 80+ 
Blze, 80+ 
St. V., 80+ 
Gren., 80+ 
Note: "Helpful" policies served to cushion external shock and leave the country no 
weaker than before. "Harmful" policies were worse than "failures" because they
aggravated the consequences of the shock, where failed policies simply were of no 
assistance. No verdict can be entered when policies are quite recent or data for 
full analysis of the1r impact is limited. 
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Appendix 
A Kethodolo1y for Si ■ ulatin1 the Effects of E1ternal Shocks 
Be3in by aol~in1 the price-output relationships of the Worrell-Bolder 
(198.. ] aodel to 1ive national income as a function of exports, export 
prices and import prices. The model is modified to disaggregate the price 
of tradables into export and import prices. Between 8°'9 and 9°'9 of 
tradable output is exported, for all the countries so far tested; we 
approximate by equating the production of exports and the output of 
tradables. Writing all relationships in rates of change, we have 
(Al) lt = ao + al PX + a2Pm + a S + a4r3 
(A2) Go = bo + bly + b2(Pm - Pm> + b3Qn(-l) 
(A3) PD = co + C1Gn_ + C2Pm + C3S + C4r 
I 
(A4) y = «x X + 0.n QD 
(AS) Pt = 13:s.Px + flmPm 
The variables are (reading across): 
x exports 
P price indices; the GDP deflator (below) has no subscript; 
other prices are indicated by subscripts 
m imports 
s a measure of unit labour costs 
r the cost of bank finance 
Q output; subscript indicates which sector 
. n non-tradables 
y national income 
t tradables 
«x, «n: share of x and <1n in y 
~x• ~11 : share of x and min (x + m) 
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All variables are in real te~■ s. The first equation estimates the 
supply of exports. the second the demand for non-tradable aoods as 
perceived by firms in that sector, and the third measures the supply price 
of non-tradables, once firms determine their response to the expected 
demand. These relationships aay be solved for income as a function of 
exports and the terms of trade (the prices of exports and imports). The 
solution is of the form 
where Ai are combinations of the estimated coefficients, the a's and the 
~•s. 
The first exercise carried out was to determine the effects of 
weakness in the markets for those commodities (bauxite, alumina, oil, 
tourism) where output is not determined predominantly by supply factors. 
To do this, we adjusted the export series, replacing the actual exports of 
these commodities with values based on straight line projections of the 
trends of the 1960s. We then derive the growth of income which would have 
resulted, using (A6). This procedure depends on the notion that the 
export sector is the essential engine of growth. We test for the 
feasibility of the resulting income series by working out the implications 
for savings and investment and for the government budget. 
The investment required to sustain the growth rate is derived from an 
incremental capital output ratio, based on observations averaged over the 
period of analysis. Some judgment is necessary to eliminate extreme 
values of the ICOR. The existence of spare capacity in all industries 
means that output can expand at any time (in theory) without additional 
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capital foraation. However, Ye doubt this will be true over an eztended 
period, because of the need for ■ odernisation. (Also, the depreciation 
series are often deficient, and Ye need to use aross capital formation.) 
Private sector savinas are derived usina savinas propensities culled from 
previous studies (for Barbados and Jamaica) and simple ratios elsewhere. 
Government's current consumption expenditure is taken at the observed 
levels, and revenues are derived from the function 
(A7) i.v = do + d1(P + y) 
where Pis the GDP deflator given by 
Assuming that government capital expenditure approximates government fixed 
capital formation (where it clearly does not, and current spending is 
classified in the capital budget, adjustments can be made) the current 
account (deflated by P) provides a measure of government saving. 
The remaining funds for the investment programme come from 
foreigners. Together with exports and imports they indicate what the 
impact on foreign ezchange reserves will be. Imports are derived from 
The reserves derived from these calculations are compared with a reserves 
target. We chose a minimum reserve level of zero; it is easy to adjust 
the simulations for any other. 
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To keep reserves ab9ve taraet, the authorities may cut iaports by 
increasina their relative prices or cut aovern.aent consump~ion to increase 
official savings and reduce imports. Alternatively, the arowth rate may 
slow down, either by deliberate policy or by the requirements of external 
balance. We may calculate the changes in each case which would be 
sufficient to allow for a feasible combination of income arowth and 
foreign exchange use. The best feasible option (the one with the fastest 
rate of growth) is compared with the actual outcomes. 
The whole exercise is then repeated for import and export prices, 
substituting for x from equation (Al) to obtain a replacement =or ~quation 
(A6): 
(AlO) 
where the Bi are combinations of the Ai and ai. 
In the accompanying charts the variables representing actual outcomes 
(Y, DR) have no number; simulations for alternative export demand patterns 
appear with a one (Yl, DR!) and those for the alternative terms of trade 
appear with a two. 
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